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Some Progress in Meeting on Liability and Redress for GMOs

South-North Development Monitor (SUNS) #6654, 6 March 2009

Environment: Talks on liability and redress for GMOs make some progress

Mexico City, 5 Mar (Lim Li Lin) — Parties to the UN Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, at a meeting in Mexico City, have agreed that a legally-binding Supplementary Protocol will be developed on liability and redress for damage from genetically modified organisms (GMOs).

The negotiations took place from 23-27 February 2009, continuing from five previous meetings of a working group on liability and redress that began its work in 2005.

The Mexico City negotiations inched slowly forward, dealing with a number of difficult issues. Though some progress was made, much remains unresolved, one key disagreement being what should form part of the Supplementary Protocol.

While "nothing is agreed until everything is agreed", the meeting did agree that the form of the instrument would be a Supplementary Protocol to the Cartagena Protocol. This means that the Supplementary Protocol must be adopted by consensus, and the number of Parties required for its entry into force will be specified in the Supplementary Protocol itself (the current draft provides an option of 30 or 50 ratifications, acceptances, approvals or accessions for it to enter into force).

The other options on the form of the legally-binding instrument were an amendment of the Biosafety Protocol, an annex to the Biosafety Protocol, or a protocol to the Convention on Biological Diversity (the parent treaty of the Biosafety Protocol). The Co-Chairs (Jimena Nieto from Colombia and Rene Lefeber from the Netherlands) proposed that a supplementary protocol to the Biosafety Protocol was appropriate, given the fact that the instrument should be within the framework of biosafety, the outcome will be supplementary and is not changing anything, and annexes are restricted to scientific, technical, procedural or administrative matters. All the Parties at the meeting supported this.

The negotiations have been underway since 2005, with the working group under the Cartagena Protocol having met five times to elaborate international rules and procedures on liability and redress. Its last meeting was in March 2008, in order for the fourth Meeting of the Parties (MOP4) to the Biosafety Protocol, which was held in Bonn in May 2008, to adopt the outcome of its work.

However, the negotiations have been dogged by deep divisions between Parties that want a legally-binding international agreement on liability and redress and those that do not want it, thus making progress extremely slow. Despite an extra small group meeting known as the "Friends of the Co-Chairs" in Bonn before and during the MOP4, the negotiations still could not be concluded. Another two meetings of the "Friends of the Co-Chairs" group were mandated by a decision in Bonn, and its outcome will be forwarded to the fifth MOP to be held in Nagoya, Japan in October 2010.

The meeting in Mexico City was the first of the two "Friends of the Co-Chairs" group meetings. The next five-day meeting of this group will be held in Malaysia in early 2010. The timing of that meeting will need to meet the rule of communicating the text of any proposed protocol to the Parties to the Biosafety Protocol at least six months before its adoption.

The "Friends of the Co-Chairs" group comprises six representatives each from Asia Pacific, Africa, and Latin America and the Caribbean, two representatives each from the European Union and Central and Eastern Europe, and one each from New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland and Japan. The six representatives from the Asia Pacific region are Bangladesh, China, India, Malaysia, Palau and the Philippines.

Other Parties to the Biosafety Protocol may also attend the "Friends of the Co-Chairs" meeting. The limitation in numbers applies to the Parties that are allowed to sit at the negotiating table. Regional groupings with more than the specified number in attendance may take turns at the negotiating table, so long as no more than the specified number are sitting around the table. Observers (non-Parties and other observers) are allowed, at the discretion of the Co-Chairs, to be present to observe the negotiations.

This slow pace of the negotiations and the delay in concluding an agreement were expected. During the negotiations on the Biosafety Protocol itself, the issue of liability and redress was so contentious that it could not be included substantively in the Biosafety Protocol text, despite this being supported by nearly all developing countries at that time, who were GMO importers or subject to possible illegal or unintentional GMO transfers. Instead, a clause was included in the Biosafety Protocol that mandated further negotiations on liability and redress, setting a four-year time-frame for this work that has since expired.

The negotiations have dragged on and the outcome may now only be adopted in 2010 in Nagoya, marking a ten-year delay in having international rules and procedures for liability and redress for GMO damage (the Biosafety Protocol was adopted in 2000, and came into force in 2003). The meeting in Mexico City came after the very difficult negotiations in Bonn last May when the negotiations nearly collapsed, and a group of Like Minded Friends emerged "representing those countries whose position is that an international instrument on liability and redress should have binding elements on civil liability". This Like Minded Friends grouping led by Malaysia made a proposal that helped to break the impasse.

Finally, a careful political agreement was hammered out in Bonn, which became the basis for further negotiations. The crux of the issue was the nature of the international liability and redress regime – whether the instrument or parts of it should be legally binding. It was essentially agreed in Bonn that the international liability and redress regime would be legally binding and would comprise administrative approaches and contain: (1) a clause that would preserve the right of Parties to put in place domestic laws and policies on civil liability and redress which should include elements as stipulated in guidelines to be negotiated; (2) provisions on reciprocal recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments; and (3) a clause to review the guidelines after the entry into force of the instrument with a view to consider making them binding or elaborating a more comprehensive binding regime on civil liability.

(In the course of the negotiations over the years, there were objections from several Parties to having the international agreement set the substantive rules for civil liability whereby victims of damage from GMOs can turn to national courts for redress. Many Parties also prefer the "administrative approach" whereby liability would be a matter to be resolved between the liable entity and the executive arm of a government.)

The Bonn agreement was based on the proposal by the Like Minded Friends group, which comprised around 80 developing countries (including all of the Africa group) and Norway. This proposal was itself a heavily compromised proposal, given that most developing countries and Norway have been firmly behind a comprehensive binding civil liability regime, and had argued for this throughout the years of negotiations.

In Bonn, the final compromise package was essentially struck between the Like Minded Friends group and Japan, which had initially opposed including one binding provision on civil liability. Peru and Paraguay had also initially opposed having a binding administrative approach. In the discussion on the text that was to be the basis for further work, Brazil had stipulated a number of caveats based on trade concerns. However, given the divide, the compromise was put forward in order to reach a common understanding on the direction of the negotiations in order to advance the negotiations. Other components of the "package" agreed in Bonn included guidelines on civil liability, a supplementary compensation scheme, settlement of claims, and complementary capacity-building measures.

The meeting in Mexico City discussed the proposed operational text that will be in the legally-binding Supplementary Protocol. This includes the administrative approach and the few provisions on civil liability. There are still numerous square brackets (indicating a lack of consensus) in this text.

The guidelines on civil liability, and other provisions (supplementary compensation scheme, settlement of claims, and complementary capacity-building measures) were not discussed. Civil society observers at the meeting expressed concern that the one last meeting in Malaysia in 2010 would not be sufficient to complete the negotiations. An additional concern was that given the time constraints, other important provisions, such as the supplementary compensation scheme, would be relegated to a decision of the MOP, rather than included in the legally-binding Supplementary Protocol, which would need to conform to the six-month rule to be adopted by the MOP meeting in Nagoya in 2010. By default, if there is insufficient time to negotiate the other provisions, they may not be included in the Supplementary Protocol, but rather be negotiated in Nagoya as part of a decision of the MOP.

As part of the report of the Mexico City meeting, a draft decision for MOP5 in Nagoya is placed in an appendix. The Supplementary Protocol as well as the guidelines on civil liability are both annexes to the draft decision for MOP5. This indicates that the guidelines on civil liability will not be part of the Supplementary Protocol (which will be a legally-binding treaty). However, this is still a draft decision, and the final decision will be made in Nagoya.

A number of issues proved particularly difficult, and point to the deep gulf that still exists between the Parties. These included issues such as whether "products thereof" (products derived from GMOs) should be included in the scope of the Supplementary Protocol, limitation in time, damage to human health, the concept of imminent threat of damage, response measures, the definition of operator, exemptions and mitigation, and financial security. These issues are being addressed in the context of a legally-binding administrative approach.

On the third day of the meeting in Mexico City, the few legally-binding provisions on civil liability were discussed. The agreement in Bonn was that these provisions would be part of the legally-binding instrument – preserving the right of Parties to put in place domestic laws and policies on civil liability and redress, recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, and a review of the civil liability guidelines. During the discussion, it appeared that some Parties were attempting to retreat from the Bonn agreement.

Panama stated that the legally-binding Supplementary Protocol was only for the administrative approach, and that civil liability provisions would be contained in a decision of the fifth MOP. This was met with an unhappy response from Malaysia, supported by Norway and Ethiopia. Co-Chair Lefeber also clarified that the agreement reached in Bonn was to work on some legal provisions on civil liability in the same instrument that contains the provisions on administrative approaches.

The meeting then proceeded to discuss the clauses on civil liability to be included in the legally-binding instrument. On the right of Parties to develop a domestic civil liability regime, there were two options in the text from Bonn. Option 1
(proposed by Japan) simply stated that "Parties may or may not develop a civil liability system or may apply their existing one in accordance with their needs to deal with living modified organisms". Option 2 spelt out the right of Parties to have a domestic civil liability regime, and specified the elements that this would include, taking into account the guidelines on civil liability.

The discussions progressed relatively smoothly on this issue. Entrenched positions on the issue of whether financial security should be addressed as an element in domestic civil liability regimes could not be reconciled. The Group of Latin American and Caribbean (GRULAC) countries insisted that this would be a trade barrier.

On the recognition and enforcement of judgments, the European Community (EC) was adamant that this was something that they could not address in any substantive way. The original proposal in Bonn from the Like Minded Friends group simply envisaged that Parties should recognize and enforce foreign judgments on liability and redress for damage caused by GMOs according to domestic laws, and that any Party which does not have legislation on recognition of foreign judgments should endeavour to enact such laws. In the event that Parties do have domestic laws on this, they should endeavour to extend those laws to other Parties that are not presently covered by those laws.

The final part of the package relating to the binding civil liability clause was the review of the guidelines with a view to considering a binding civil liability regime. The GRULAC countries wanted this provision deleted. The EC stated that the political agreement in Bonn was to have a review clause in the legally-binding instrument, but it could not be a review of the civil liability guidelines, as they are not part of the Supplementary Protocol.

Ethiopia responded strongly to these statements. It said that having guidelines on civil liability was already a compromise as the position of developing countries all this while has been to have a legally-binding international law on civil liability, but from what has been said, the guidelines might as well be thrown away. "How can we review the guidelines if we do not recognize that they exist? Unless the guidelines are in someway acknowledged in the Supplementary Protocol, they are not in existence," Ethiopia said. It asked for the guidelines to be acknowledged, and for there to be a review process to allow the possibility that they could become international law.

Malaysia also responded strongly. It said that the overwhelming number of countries wanted a binding civil liability regime, but this was contentious, and so the compromise package was agreed upon. This was further diluted because of continuing objections, to the point where developing countries have only one binding element on civil liability – "virtually nothing". In the light of what they had to give up, the Like Minded Friends group then asked for the opportunity to review the guidelines. If this is not granted, it is bad faith, Malaysia said.

The EC confirmed that it would like to have a general review clause of the Supplementary Protocol in the Protocol itself, and a clause on reviewing the guidelines in the decision that adopts the guidelines. It said that the two processes should be separate.

Malaysia clarified that the Like Minded Friends group had accepted as a compromise, a weak provision on civil liability with a review clause with a view to making them binding. All this is located in the legally-binding approach, and that was also the compromise. The outcome of the review is not being prejudged, it said, but merely given direction. The review is therefore not about evaluating its effectiveness but with a view towards a binding civil liability regime.

Co-Chair Lefeber then proposed to move the discussions forward and to delete Option 1 on the right of Parties to develop a domestic civil liability regime, since the discussion had shown that there was consensus around working with Option 2.

However, the EC said that in the light of the discussions on the review clause, it would like to keep Option 1. This was met with angry responses from Ethiopia and Malaysia. Malaysia said that everything that it had agreed to in the spirit of compromise so far, such as on exemptions, it reserved again. Ethiopia also stated that it was going back on everything that it had agreed to delete, and wanted all the text back in place. It said that it was happy to have either Option 1 deleted or all the cancelled text reinstated.

Amidst this tense atmosphere, the Co-Chairs proposed a break, during which bilateral consultations took place informally. After the break, Malaysia proposed text in an attempt to find a compromise. The current draft of this provision with the bracketed un-agreed parts now reads:

"[1. The [institutional mechanism under the Supplementary Protocol] shall undertake [3] years after the entry into force of this Supplementary Protocol a review of the effectiveness of the Supplementary Protocol.

"2. This review shall include a consideration of [further and necessary steps] [whether further steps are necessary] to provide for an effective civil liability regime on liability and redress.]"

These clauses will now go forward to the next meeting of the "Friends of the Co-Chairs" group in Malaysia next year. +

 

 

March 9th, 2009 | Category: Cartagena Protocol
«  
  »

Some Progress in Meeting on Liability and Redress for GMOs

Environment: Talks on liability and redress for GMOs make some progress

Mexico City, 5 Mar (Lim Li Lin) — Parties to the UN Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, at a meeting in Mexico City, have agreed that a legally-binding Supplementary Protocol will be developed on liability and redress for damage from genetically modified organisms (GMOs).

The negotiations took place from 23-27 February 2009, continuing from five previous meetings of a working group on liability and redress that began its work in 2005.

The Mexico City negotiations inched slowly forward, dealing with a number of difficult issues. Though some progress was made, much remains unresolved, one key disagreement being what should form part of the Supplementary Protocol.

While "nothing is agreed until everything is agreed", the meeting did agree that the form of the instrument would be a Supplementary Protocol to the Cartagena Protocol. This means that the Supplementary Protocol must be adopted by consensus, and the number of Parties required for its entry into force will be specified in the Supplementary Protocol itself (the current draft provides an option of 30 or 50 ratifications, acceptances, approvals or accessions for it to enter into force).

The other options on the form of the legally-binding instrument were an amendment of the Biosafety Protocol, an annex to the Biosafety Protocol, or a protocol to the Convention on Biological Diversity (the parent treaty of the Biosafety Protocol). The Co-Chairs (Jimena Nieto from Colombia and Rene Lefeber from the Netherlands) proposed that a supplementary protocol to the Biosafety Protocol was appropriate, given the fact that the instrument should be within the framework of biosafety, the outcome will be supplementary and is not changing anything, and annexes are restricted to scientific, technical, procedural or administrative matters. All the Parties at the meeting supported this.

The negotiations have been underway since 2005, with the working group under the Cartagena Protocol having met five times to elaborate international rules and procedures on liability and redress. Its last meeting was in March 2008, in order for the fourth Meeting of the Parties (MOP4) to the Biosafety Protocol, which was held in Bonn in May 2008, to adopt the outcome of its work.

However, the negotiations have been dogged by deep divisions between Parties that want a legally-binding international agreement on liability and redress and those that do not want it, thus making progress extremely slow. Despite an extra small group meeting known as the "Friends of the Co-Chairs" in Bonn before and during the MOP4, the negotiations still could not be concluded. Another two meetings of the "Friends of the Co-Chairs" group were mandated by a decision in Bonn, and its outcome will be forwarded to the fifth MOP to be held in Nagoya, Japan in October 2010.

The meeting in Mexico City was the first of the two "Friends of the Co-Chairs" group meetings. The next five-day meeting of this group will be held in Malaysia in early 2010. The timing of that meeting will need to meet the rule of communicating the text of any proposed protocol to the Parties to the Biosafety Protocol at least six months before its adoption.

The "Friends of the Co-Chairs" group comprises six representatives each from Asia Pacific, Africa, and Latin America and the Caribbean, two representatives each from the European Union and Central and Eastern Europe, and one each from New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland and Japan. The six representatives from the Asia Pacific region are Bangladesh, China, India, Malaysia, Palau and the Philippines.

Other Parties to the Biosafety Protocol may also attend the "Friends of the Co-Chairs" meeting. The limitation in numbers applies to the Parties that are allowed to sit at the negotiating table. Regional groupings with more than the specified number in attendance may take turns at the negotiating table, so long as no more than the specified number are sitting around the table. Observers (non-Parties and other observers) are allowed, at the discretion of the Co-Chairs, to be present to observe the negotiations.

This slow pace of the negotiations and the delay in concluding an agreement were expected. During the negotiations on the Biosafety Protocol itself, the issue of liability and redress was so contentious that it could not be included substantively in the Biosafety Protocol text, despite this being supported by nearly all developing countries at that time, who were GMO importers or subject to possible illegal or unintentional GMO transfers. Instead, a clause was included in the Biosafety Protocol that mandated further negotiations on liability and redress, setting a four-year time-frame for this work that has since expired.

The negotiations have dragged on and the outcome may now only be adopted in 2010 in Nagoya, marking a ten-year delay in having international rules and procedures for liability and redress for GMO damage (the Biosafety Protocol was adopted in 2000, and came into force in 2003). The meeting in Mexico City came after the very difficult negotiations in Bonn last May when the negotiations nearly collapsed, and a group of Like Minded Friends emerged "representing those countries whose position is that an international instrument on liability and redress should have binding elements on civil liability". This Like Minded Friends grouping led by Malaysia made a proposal that helped to break the impasse.

Finally, a careful political agreement was hammered out in Bonn, which became the basis for further negotiations. The crux of the issue was the nature of the international liability and redress regime – whether the instrument or parts of it should be legally binding. It was essentially agreed in Bonn that the international liability and redress regime would be legally binding and would comprise administrative approaches and contain: (1) a clause that would preserve the right of Parties to put in place domestic laws and policies on civil liability and redress which should include elements as stipulated in guidelines to be negotiated; (2) provisions on reciprocal recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments; and (3) a clause to review the guidelines after the entry into force of the instrument with a view to consider making them binding or elaborating a more comprehensive binding regime on civil liability.

(In the course of the negotiations over the years, there were objections from several Parties to having the international agreement set the substantive rules for civil liability whereby victims of damage from GMOs can turn to national courts for redress. Many Parties also prefer the "administrative approach" whereby liability would be a matter to be resolved between the liable entity and the executive arm of a government.)

The Bonn agreement was based on the proposal by the Like Minded Friends group, which comprised around 80 developing countries (including all of the Africa group) and Norway. This proposal was itself a heavily compromised proposal, given that most developing countries and Norway have been firmly behind a comprehensive binding civil liability regime, and had argued for this throughout the years of negotiations.

In Bonn, the final compromise package was essentially struck between the Like Minded Friends group and Japan, which had initially opposed including one binding provision on civil liability. Peru and Paraguay had also initially opposed having a binding administrative approach. In the discussion on the text that was to be the basis for further work, Brazil had stipulated a number of caveats based on trade concerns. However, given the divide, the compromise was put forward in order to reach a common understanding on the direction of the negotiations in order to advance the negotiations. Other components of the "package" agreed in Bonn included guidelines on civil liability, a supplementary compensation scheme, settlement of claims, and complementary capacity-building measures.

The meeting in Mexico City discussed the proposed operational text that will be in the legally-binding Supplementary Protocol. This includes the administrative approach and the few provisions on civil liability. There are still numerous square brackets (indicating a lack of consensus) in this text.

The guidelines on civil liability, and other provisions (supplementary compensation scheme, settlement of claims, and complementary capacity-building measures) were not discussed. Civil society observers at the meeting expressed concern that the one last meeting in Malaysia in 2010 would not be sufficient to complete the negotiations. An additional concern was that given the time constraints, other important provisions, such as the supplementary compensation scheme, would be relegated to a decision of the MOP, rather than included in the legally-binding Supplementary Protocol, which would need to conform to the six-month rule to be adopted by the MOP meeting in Nagoya in 2010. By default, if there is insufficient time to negotiate the other provisions, they may not be included in the Supplementary Protocol, but rather be negotiated in Nagoya as part of a decision of the MOP.

As part of the report of the Mexico City meeting, a draft decision for MOP5 in Nagoya is placed in an appendix. The Supplementary Protocol as well as the guidelines on civil liability are both annexes to the draft decision for MOP5. This indicates that the guidelines on civil liability will not be part of the Supplementary Protocol (which will be a legally-binding treaty). However, this is still a draft decision, and the final decision will be made in Nagoya.

A number of issues proved particularly difficult, and point to the deep gulf that still exists between the Parties. These included issues such as whether "products thereof" (products derived from GMOs) should be included in the scope of the Supplementary Protocol, limitation in time, damage to human health, the concept of imminent threat of damage, response measures, the definition of operator, exemptions and mitigation, and financial security. These issues are being addressed in the context of a legally-binding administrative approach.

On the third day of the meeting in Mexico City, the few legally-binding provisions on civil liability were discussed. The agreement in Bonn was that these provisions would be part of the legally-binding instrument – preserving the right of Parties to put in place domestic laws and policies on civil liability and redress, recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, and a review of the civil liability guidelines. During the discussion, it appeared that some Parties were attempting to retreat from the Bonn agreement.

Panama stated that the legally-binding Supplementary Protocol was only for the administrative approach, and that civil liability provisions would be contained in a decision of the fifth MOP. This was met with an unhappy response from Malaysia, supported by Norway and Ethiopia. Co-Chair Lefeber also clarified that the agreement reached in Bonn was to work on some legal provisions on civil liability in the same instrument that contains the provisions on administrative approaches.

The meeting then proceeded to discuss the clauses on civil liability to be included in the legally-binding instrument. On the right of Parties to develop a domestic civil liability regime, there were two options in the text from Bonn. Option 1
(proposed by Japan) simply stated that "Parties may or may not develop a civil liability system or may apply their existing one in accordance with their needs to deal with living modified organisms". Option 2 spelt out the right of Parties to have a domestic civil liability regime, and specified the elements that this would include, taking into account the guidelines on civil liability.

The discussions progressed relatively smoothly on this issue. Entrenched positions on the issue of whether financial security should be addressed as an element in domestic civil liability regimes could not be reconciled. The Group of Latin American and Caribbean (GRULAC) countries insisted that this would be a trade barrier.

On the recognition and enforcement of judgments, the European Community (EC) was adamant that this was something that they could not address in any substantive way. The original proposal in Bonn from the Like Minded Friends group simply envisaged that Parties should recognize and enforce foreign judgments on liability and redress for damage caused by GMOs according to domestic laws, and that any Party which does not have legislation on recognition of foreign judgments should endeavour to enact such laws. In the event that Parties do have domestic laws on this, they should endeavour to extend those laws to other Parties that are not presently covered by those laws.

The final part of the package relating to the binding civil liability clause was the review of the guidelines with a view to considering a binding civil liability regime. The GRULAC countries wanted this provision deleted. The EC stated that the political agreement in Bonn was to have a review clause in the legally-binding instrument, but it could not be a review of the civil liability guidelines, as they are not part of the Supplementary Protocol.

Ethiopia responded strongly to these statements. It said that having guidelines on civil liability was already a compromise as the position of developing countries all this while has been to have a legally-binding international law on civil liability, but from what has been said, the guidelines might as well be thrown away. "How can we review the guidelines if we do not recognize that they exist? Unless the guidelines are in someway acknowledged in the Supplementary Protocol, they are not in existence," Ethiopia said. It asked for the guidelines to be acknowledged, and for there to be a review process to allow the possibility that they could become international law.

Malaysia also responded strongly. It said that the overwhelming number of countries wanted a binding civil liability regime, but this was contentious, and so the compromise package was agreed upon. This was further diluted because of continuing objections, to the point where developing countries have only one binding element on civil liability – "virtually nothing". In the light of what they had to give up, the Like Minded Friends group then asked for the opportunity to review the guidelines. If this is not granted, it is bad faith, Malaysia said.

The EC confirmed that it would like to have a general review clause of the Supplementary Protocol in the Protocol itself, and a clause on reviewing the guidelines in the decision that adopts the guidelines. It said that the two processes should be separate.

Malaysia clarified that the Like Minded Friends group had accepted as a compromise, a weak provision on civil liability with a review clause with a view to making them binding. All this is located in the legally-binding approach, and that was also the compromise. The outcome of the review is not being prejudged, it said, but merely given direction. The review is therefore not about evaluating its effectiveness but with a view towards a binding civil liability regime.

Co-Chair Lefeber then proposed to move the discussions forward and to delete Option 1 on the right of Parties to develop a domestic civil liability regime, since the discussion had shown that there was consensus around working with Option 2.

However, the EC said that in the light of the discussions on the review clause, it would like to keep Option 1. This was met with angry responses from Ethiopia and Malaysia. Malaysia said that everything that it had agreed to in the spirit of compromise so far, such as on exemptions, it reserved again. Ethiopia also stated that it was going back on everything that it had agreed to delete, and wanted all the text back in place. It said that it was happy to have either Option 1 deleted or all the cancelled text reinstated.

Amidst this tense atmosphere, the Co-Chairs proposed a break, during which bilateral consultations took place informally. After the break, Malaysia proposed text in an attempt to find a compromise. The current draft of this provision with the bracketed un-agreed parts now reads:

"[1. The [institutional mechanism under the Supplementary Protocol] shall undertake [3] years after the entry into force of this Supplementary Protocol a review of the effectiveness of the Supplementary Protocol.

"2. This review shall include a consideration of [further and necessary steps] [whether further steps are necessary] to provide for an effective civil liability regime on liability and redress.]"

These clauses will now go forward to the next meeting of the "Friends of the Co-Chairs" group in Malaysia next year. +

 

March 6th, 2009 | Category: Global Agreements and Fora
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