Report Blasts Lax Oversight of GMOs in the US

Executive Summary
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service Controls Over Issuance of Genetically Engineered Organism Release Permits (Audit Report 50601-8-Te)

The number of approved applications to field test genetically engineered (GE) crops in the United States has increased significantly since 1986, when the Department began regulating experimental GE plants. Since that time, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) has approved over 10,600 applications for more than 49,300 field sites. Biotechnology companies are investing millions of dollars to develop new GE plants, some with the goal of commercializing them for use as food, feed, industrial compounds, and medicines. The rapid growth of agricultural biotechnology, and its prominent position in the public eye, increases USDA’s responsibility to ensure that regulated GE plants, including their pollen and seeds, do not persist in the environment. However, as the number of approved applications to field test new GE plants continues to rise, we are concerned that the Department’s efforts to regulate those crops have not kept pace.

To evaluate the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service’s (APHIS) controls over releases and movements of regulated GE plants, we visited 91 field test sites in 22 States that were either planted or harvested. We inspected the sites for compliance with APHIS’ requirements for the growing or postharvest season. We found that APHIS, the USDA agency that oversees biotechnology regulatory functions for the Department, needs to strengthen its accountability for field tests of GE crops. In fact, at various stages of the field test process—from approval of applications to inspection of fields—weaknesses in APHIS regulations and internal management controls increase the risk that regulated genetically engineered organisms (GEO) will inadvertently persist in the environment before they are deemed safe to grow without regulation.

Accountability for GE Crops Needs Improvement
Depending on the nature of the GE crop, APHIS authorizes field tests through two methods: permits and notifications. For field tests of high-risk GE crops, such as those designed to produce pharmaceutical and industrial compounds, APHIS issues permits. For GE crops that APHIS considers low-risk based on its scientific experience with the plants, applicants can use the more streamlined notification process. We found, however, that APHIS lacks basic information about the field test sites it approves and is responsible for monitoring, including where and how the crops are being grown, and what becomes of them at the end of the field test.

• Of primary concern, the precise locations of all GE field test sites planted in the United States are not always known. After authorizing field tests, APHIS does not follow up with all permit and notification holders to find out exactly where the fields have been planted or if they have been planted at all. In some cases, APHIS may only be aware of the State and county where an applicant plans to conduct a field test. Without knowing the locations of all planted field test sites, including their global positioning system (GPS) coordinates, APHIS cannot effectively monitor permit and notification holders’ compliance with field test requirements. In January 2005, APHIS issued a memorandum that requested notification holders to voluntarily submit GPS coordinates or other information to identify the field test after planting.

• Before approving field tests, APHIS does not review notification applicants’ containment protocols, which describe how the applicant plans to contain the GE crop within the field test site and prevent it from persisting in the environment. Instead, APHIS allows notification holders to provide the protocols verbally if their field test sites are selected for inspection. Since notifications comprise the vast majority of field test authorizations, this policy undermines both the field test approval and inspection processes.

• At the conclusion of the field test, APHIS does not require permit holders to report on the final disposition of GE pharmaceutical and industrial harvests, which are modified for nonfood purposes and may pose a threat to the food supply if unintentionally released. As a result, we found that two large harvests of GE pharmaceutical crops remained in storage at the field test sites for over a year without APHIS’ knowledge or approval of the storage facility.

In addition, APHIS does not thoroughly document its reviews of applications in the official files. Specifically, APHIS biotechnologists do not sufficiently document their review process and scientific basis for approving initial field test applications. APHIS also does not effectively track information required during the field tests, including approved applicants’ progress reports, which should contain the results of field tests, including any harmful effects on the environment. Although we noted that many permit and notification holders submit these required progress reports late or not at all, APHIS does not always follow up to obtain the information.

Weaknesses in Inspections and Enforcement

APHIS’ field test inspection process can be improved in a number of areas. Inspection requirements are vague and there is a lack of coordination between the two APHIS units responsible for the inspection program, Biotechnology Regulatory Services (BRS) and Plant Protection and Quarantine (PPQ). BRS is responsible for overall management of the program, while PPQ officers perform most of the actual inspections of GE field test sites. We found that BRS does not have a formal, risk-based process for selecting individual sites for inspection, and that PPQ does not complete all of the inspections BRS requests, including inspections of pharmaceutical and industrial crops.

For example, we found that PPQ did not inspect all pharmaceutical and industrial field test sites five times during the 2003 growing season, as APHIS has announced to the public. APHIS has also stated publicly that pharmaceutical and industrial field test sites would be inspected twice during the postharvest period, or the year following the end of the field test, during which the field must be monitored for regrowth of the GE crop. In one case, a violation at a pharmaceutical field test site in our sample went undetected because PPQ did not perform the required inspections at that site during the 2003 postharvest monitoring period.

Further contributing to the inspection problem, neither BRS nor PPQ kept track of the total number of inspections that are actually completed. Although APHIS agreed to improve its tracking of inspection reports following an Office of Inspector General (OIG) audit more than 10 years ago, the agency continued to lack an effective, comprehensive management information system to account for all inspections and their outcomes. In fact, we found 11 violations that were not recorded in BRS’ compliance infractions database at the time of our audit, even though they were reported to BRS or could have been identified from information BRS already had. APHIS took administrative action on only 1 of those 11 violations.

APHIS subsequently advised us that in September 2004, it had implemented some changes in the inspection process that included an agreement between BRS and PPQ that clarified responsibility for conducting inspections. BRS also developed a methodology for selecting notifications for inspection based upon risk. However, our review of the agreement between BRS and PPQ found that it did not include inspections of nonpharmaceutical and nonindustrial permits. BRS continues to select entire permits and notifications for PPQ to inspect which may cover numerous field test sites. Consequently, BRS has no assurance that the highest risk field sites are inspected. Also, BRS initiated an interim inspection tracking system in February 2005, during our audit, but the effectiveness of this system has not been reviewed or tested by the OIG.

Even if APHIS improves its inspection process, we found that APHIS has not updated its regulations to reflect the Plant Protection Act of 2000, under which APHIS carries out its biotechnology oversight duties. Also, an Office of the General Counsel official advised us that APHIS currently does not have legislative authority to hold applicants financially responsible for costs incurred by USDA due to an unauthorized release of regulated GEOs. Because APHIS cannot require applicants to provide proof of financial responsibility before it authorizes field tests, USDA may have to bear the expense of removing GE material from the environment in the event of an unintentional release.

Inadequate Guidance for Containing GE Crops and Seeds

Finally, we found that APHIS guidance should be strengthened to prevent the persistence of GE crops outside the field test. For example, APHIS does not specify when GE crops must be destroyed, or “devitalized,” following the field test. Approved applicants sometimes allow harvested crops to lie in the field test site for months at a time, their seeds exposed to animals and the elements. Also, because APHIS has not specifically addressed the need to physically restrict edible GE crops from public access, we found a regulated edible GE crop, which had not gone through the Food and Drug Administration’s regulatory process for approval for human consumption, growing where they could easily be taken and eaten by passersby.

GE crops have come to play an important role in American agriculture, and many crops currently being field tested will eventually be approved as safe to grow and eat without regulation. However, while they remain under USDA’s jurisdiction, GE crops and harvests—especially those developed for pharmaceutical and industrial purposes—must be carefully regulated. Although we noted relatively few violations of existing requirements at the time of our field visits, we concluded that APHIS’ current regulations, policies, and procedures do not go far enough to ensure the safe introduction of agricultural biotechnology. To meet its strategic goals and inspire public confidence in USDA’s biotechnology regulatory program, APHIS must continue to refine and strengthen the GEO field release process.

Recommendations In Brief

To maintain accountability for regulated GE crops, APHIS needs to require more information both prior to and during the field test. Specifically, APHIS needs to:

• obtain GPS coordinates of all planted field test sites, enabling APHIS to identify where regulated GE crops are planted at any given time;

• obtain all applicants’ scientific protocols for conducting field tests;

• obtain reports on the final disposition of high-risk pharmaceutical and industrial harvests; and

• seek legislative authority to require permit applicants, based on the level of risk, to provide proof of financial responsibility, in the event of an unauthorized GEO release.

To strengthen monitoring of GE field test sites, APHIS needs to formalize its inspection process and assign and coordinate the responsibilities of BRS and PPQ. APHIS also needs to update its regulations and develop a comprehensive management information system for tracking the receipt and review of all information associated with GEO release permits and notifications.

Finally, to make sure that approved applicants take appropriate steps to prevent GE crops from proliferating outside the field test site, APHIS needs to develop guidance that specifically addresses devitalization deadlines and edible crops.

Agency Response

In its response dated November 2, 2005, APHIS officials generally agreed with OIG’s recommendations and have completed or began implementing 23 of the 28 recommendations in the report.

APHIS is in the process of requiring GPS coordinates of each field site on the 28-day planting reports, requiring the reporting of the disposal of GE pharmaceutical and industrial harvest in the field report submitted 21 days prior to harvest, and obtaining a determination from the Office of the Secretary to seek legislative authority to require applicants to provide proof of financial responsibility in the event of an unauthorized GEO release.

APHIS has established a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between BRS and PPQ to formalize inspection responsibilities, better coordinate inspections in regions, and ensure inspections are completed in a timely manner. APHIS is in the process of updating, consolidating and clarifying its regulations in regards to GE regulated field releases and incorporating provisions of the Plant Protection Act of 2000. APHIS has also designed a single management information system for tracking permit and notification inspections and field test reports.

APHIS disagreed with recommendations associated with obtaining notification applicants’ scientific protocols for conducting field tests, reviewing these protocols by biotechnologists, and distributing these protocols to PPQ officers to use in conducting inspections of field sites under notification. APHIS also contends that the current system of performance–based regulatory standards for notifications is effective at protecting the American agriculture. Lastly, APHIS did not agree with developing policy guidelines for restricting public access to edible regulated crops when conducting field tests and with developing policies and procedures for selecting specific field test sites for inspection based on risk.

OIG Position

We generally concur with APHIS’ response for 23 of the 28 recommendations in the report and have reached management decision on one recommendation. Actions necessary to reach management decision on the remaining recommendations are discussed in the Findings and Recommendations sections.

APHIS stated that its current system of performance–based regulatory standards for notifications is effective at protecting American agriculture. We believe that these performance-based regulatory standards do not preclude submission of protocols to APHIS prior to approval of the field test. By not obtaining copies of the protocols, APHIS is relinquishing its regulatory responsibility in favor of self-certification by the notification applicants—namely, the applicants merely certify in their notification applications that they will meet the performance standards. Further, approved protocols are important control documents that PPQ officers should receive from BRS before they perform an inspection.

Although APHIS disagreed with developing policy guidelines for restricting public access to field tests of edible regulated GE crops, APHIS’ strategic plan states that its mission includes protecting human health and safety. The edible GE crops under APHIS’ jurisdiction are regulated and, therefore, we believe that access should be controlled. Edible regulated GE crops cannot be grown without restrictions and should not be available even for unauthorized human consumption, while still regulated.

Although two APHIS units, BRS and PPQ, share responsibility for inspections of field test sites, BRS is responsible for the overall inspection process. However, under the current site selection process, once BRS has selected a notification or permit for inspection PPQ is then allowed to choose the specific inspection site. The National Academy of Sciences states that risks must be assessed according to the organism, trait, and environment. Thus, the environment is an important risk factor which BRS should use in the selection of field sites for inspection to ensure that the highest risk sites are always selected.

Report Blasts Lax Oversight of GMOs in the US

Item 1

Executive Summary

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service Controls Over Issuance of Genetically
Engineered Organism Release Permits (Audit Report 50601-8-Te)
Results in Brief

The number of approved applications to field test genetically engineered
(GE) crops in the United States has increased significantly since 1986, when
the Department began regulating experimental GE plants. Since that time, the
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) has approved over 10,600
applications for more than 49,300 field sites. Biotechnology companies are
investing millions of dollars to develop new GE plants, some with the goal of
commercializing them for use as food, feed, industrial compounds, and
medicines. The rapid growth of agricultural biotechnology, and its prominent
position in the public eye, increases USDA’s responsibility to ensure that
regulated GE plants, including their pollen and seeds, do not persist in the
environment. However, as the number of approved applications to field test
new GE plants continues to rise, we are concerned that the Department’s
efforts to regulate those crops have not kept pace.

To evaluate the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service’s (APHIS)
controls over releases and movements of regulated GE plants, we visited 91
field test sites in 22 States that were either planted or harvested. We inspected
the sites for compliance with APHIS’ requirements for the growing or
postharvest season. We found that APHIS, the USDA agency that oversees
biotechnology regulatory functions for the Department, needs to strengthen
its accountability for field tests of GE crops. In fact, at various stages of the
field test process—from approval of applications to inspection of fields—
weaknesses in APHIS regulations and internal management controls increase
the risk that regulated genetically engineered organisms (GEO) will
inadvertently persist in the environment before they are deemed safe to grow
without regulation.

Accountability for GE Crops Needs Improvement

Depending on the nature of the GE crop, APHIS authorizes field tests
through two methods: permits and notifications. For field tests of high-risk
GE crops, such as those designed to produce pharmaceutical and industrial
compounds, APHIS issues permits. For GE crops that APHIS considers
low-risk based on its scientific experience with the plants, applicants can use
the more streamlined notification process. We found, however, that APHIS
lacks basic information about the field test sites it approves and is responsible
for monitoring, including where and how the crops are being grown, and
what becomes of them at the end of the field test.

• Of primary concern, the precise locations of all GE field test sites planted
in the United States are not always known. After authorizing field tests,
APHIS does not follow up with all permit and notification holders to find
out exactly where the fields have been planted or if they have been
planted at all. In some cases, APHIS may only be aware of the State and
county where an applicant plans to conduct a field test. Without knowing
the locations of all planted field test sites, including their global
positioning system (GPS) coordinates, APHIS cannot effectively monitor
permit and notification holders’ compliance with field test requirements.
In January 2005, APHIS issued a memorandum that requested
notification holders to voluntarily submit GPS coordinates or other
information to identify the field test after planting.

• Before approving field tests, APHIS does not review notification
applicants’ containment protocols, which describe how the applicant
plans to contain the GE crop within the field test site and prevent it from
persisting in the environment. Instead, APHIS allows notification holders
to provide the protocols verbally if their field test sites are selected for
inspection. Since notifications comprise the vast majority of field test
authorizations, this policy undermines both the field test approval and
inspection processes.

• At the conclusion of the field test, APHIS does not require permit holders
to report on the final disposition of GE pharmaceutical and industrial
harvests, which are modified for nonfood purposes and may pose a threat
to the food supply if unintentionally released. As a result, we found that
two large harvests of GE pharmaceutical crops remained in storage at the
field test sites for over a year without APHIS’ knowledge or approval of
the storage facility.

In addition, APHIS does not thoroughly document its reviews of applications
in the official files. Specifically, APHIS biotechnologists do not sufficiently
document their review process and scientific basis for approving initial field
test applications. APHIS also does not effectively track information required
during the field tests, including approved applicants’ progress reports, which
should contain the results of field tests, including any harmful effects on the
environment. Although we noted that many permit and notification holders
submit these required progress reports late or not at all, APHIS does not
always follow up to obtain the information.

Weaknesses in Inspections and Enforcement

APHIS’ field test inspection process can be improved in a number of areas.
Inspection requirements are vague and there is a lack of coordination between
the two APHIS units responsible for the inspection program, Biotechnology
Regulatory Services (BRS) and Plant Protection and Quarantine (PPQ). BRS
is responsible for overall management of the program, while PPQ officers
perform most of the actual inspections of GE field test sites. We found that
BRS does not have a formal, risk-based process for selecting individual sites
for inspection, and that PPQ does not complete all of the inspections BRS
requests, including inspections of pharmaceutical and industrial crops.

For example, we found that PPQ did not inspect all pharmaceutical and
industrial field test sites five times during the 2003 growing season, as
APHIS has announced to the public. APHIS has also stated publicly that
pharmaceutical and industrial field test sites would be inspected twice during
the postharvest period, or the year following the end of the field test, during
which the field must be monitored for regrowth of the GE crop. In one case,
a violation at a pharmaceutical field test site in our sample went undetected
because PPQ did not perform the required inspections at that site during the
2003 postharvest monitoring period.

Further contributing to the inspection problem, neither BRS nor PPQ kept
track of the total number of inspections that are actually completed.
Although APHIS agreed to improve its tracking of inspection reports
following an Office of Inspector General (OIG) audit more than 10 years ago,
the agency continued to lack an effective, comprehensive management
information system to account for all inspections and their outcomes. In fact,
we found 11 violations that were not recorded in BRS’ compliance
infractions database at the time of our audit, even though they were reported
to BRS or could have been identified from information BRS already had.
APHIS took administrative action on only 1 of those 11 violations.

APHIS subsequently advised us that in September 2004, it had implemented
some changes in the inspection process that included an agreement between
BRS and PPQ that clarified responsibility for conducting inspections. BRS
also developed a methodology for selecting notifications for inspection based
upon risk. However, our review of the agreement between BRS and PPQ
found that it did not include inspections of nonpharmaceutical and
nonindustrial permits. BRS continues to select entire permits and
notifications for PPQ to inspect which may cover numerous field test sites.
Consequently, BRS has no assurance that the highest risk field sites are
inspected. Also, BRS initiated an interim inspection tracking system in
February 2005, during our audit, but the effectiveness of this system has not
been reviewed or tested by the OIG.

Even if APHIS improves its inspection process, we found that APHIS has not
updated its regulations to reflect the Plant Protection Act of 2000, under
which APHIS carries out its biotechnology oversight duties. Also, an Office
of the General Counsel official advised us that APHIS currently does not
have legislative authority to hold applicants financially responsible for costs
incurred by USDA due to an unauthorized release of regulated GEOs.
Because APHIS cannot require applicants to provide proof of financial
responsibility before it authorizes field tests, USDA may have to bear the
expense of removing GE material from the environment in the event of an
unintentional release.

Inadequate Guidance for Containing GE Crops and Seeds

Finally, we found that APHIS guidance should be strengthened to prevent the
persistence of GE crops outside the field test. For example, APHIS does not
specify when GE crops must be destroyed, or “devitalized,” following the
field test. Approved applicants sometimes allow harvested crops to lie in the
field test site for months at a time, their seeds exposed to animals and the
elements. Also, because APHIS has not specifically addressed the need to
physically restrict edible GE crops from public access, we found a regulated
edible GE crop, which had not gone through the Food and Drug
Administration’s regulatory process for approval for human consumption,
growing where they could easily be taken and eaten by passersby.

GE crops have come to play an important role in American agriculture, and
many crops currently being field tested will eventually be approved as safe to
grow and eat without regulation. However, while they remain under USDA’s
jurisdiction, GE crops and harvests—especially those developed for
pharmaceutical and industrial purposes—must be carefully regulated.
Although we noted relatively few violations of existing requirements at the
time of our field visits, we concluded that APHIS’ current regulations,
policies, and procedures do not go far enough to ensure the safe introduction
of agricultural biotechnology. To meet its strategic goals and inspire public
confidence in USDA’s biotechnology regulatory program, APHIS must
continue to refine and strengthen the GEO field release process.

Recommendations In Brief

To maintain accountability for regulated GE crops, APHIS needs to require
more information both prior to and during the field test. Specifically, APHIS
needs to:

• obtain GPS coordinates of all planted field test sites, enabling APHIS to
identify where regulated GE crops are planted at any given time;
• obtain all applicants’ scientific protocols for conducting field tests;
• obtain reports on the final disposition of high-risk pharmaceutical and
industrial harvests; and
• seek legislative authority to require permit applicants, based on the level
of risk, to provide proof of financial responsibility, in the event of an
unauthorized GEO release.

To strengthen monitoring of GE field test sites, APHIS needs to formalize its
inspection process and assign and coordinate the responsibilities of BRS and
PPQ. APHIS also needs to update its regulations and develop a
comprehensive management information system for tracking the receipt and
review of all information associated with GEO release permits and
notifications.

Finally, to make sure that approved applicants take appropriate steps to
prevent GE crops from proliferating outside the field test site, APHIS needs
to develop guidance that specifically addresses devitalization deadlines and
edible crops.

Agency Response

In its response dated November 2, 2005, APHIS officials generally agreed
with OIG’s recommendations and have completed or began implementing 23
of the 28 recommendations in the report.

APHIS is in the process of requiring GPS coordinates of each field site on the
28-day planting reports, requiring the reporting of the disposal of GE
pharmaceutical and industrial harvest in the field report submitted 21 days
prior to harvest, and obtaining a determination from the Office of the
Secretary to seek legislative authority to require applicants to provide proof
of financial responsibility in the event of an unauthorized GEO release.

APHIS has established a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between
BRS and PPQ to formalize inspection responsibilities, better coordinate
inspections in regions, and ensure inspections are completed in a timely
manner. APHIS is in the process of updating, consolidating and clarifying its
regulations in regards to GE regulated field releases and incorporating
provisions of the Plant Protection Act of 2000. APHIS has also designed a
single management information system for tracking permit and notification
inspections and field test reports.

APHIS disagreed with recommendations associated with obtaining
notification applicants’ scientific protocols for conducting field tests,
reviewing these protocols by biotechnologists, and distributing these
protocols to PPQ officers to use in conducting inspections of field sites under
notification. APHIS also contends that the current system of performance–
based regulatory standards for notifications is effective at protecting the
American agriculture. Lastly, APHIS did not agree with developing policy
guidelines for restricting public access to edible regulated crops when
conducting field tests and with developing policies and procedures for
selecting specific field test sites for inspection based on risk.

OIG Position

We generally concur with APHIS’ response for 23 of the 28
recommendations in the report and have reached management decision on
one recommendation. Actions necessary to reach management decision on
the remaining recommendations are discussed in the Findings and
Recommendations sections.

APHIS stated that its current system of performance–based regulatory
standards for notifications is effective at protecting American agriculture.
We believe that these performance-based regulatory standards do not
preclude submission of protocols to APHIS prior to approval of the field test.
By not obtaining copies of the protocols, APHIS is relinquishing its
regulatory responsibility in favor of self-certification by the notification
applicants—namely, the applicants merely certify in their notification
applications that they will meet the performance standards. Further,
approved protocols are important control documents that PPQ officers should
receive from BRS before they perform an inspection.

Although APHIS disagreed with developing policy guidelines for restricting
public access to field tests of edible regulated GE crops, APHIS’ strategic
plan states that its mission includes protecting human health and safety. The
edible GE crops under APHIS’ jurisdiction are regulated and, therefore, we
believe that access should be controlled. Edible regulated GE crops cannot be
grown without restrictions and should not be available even for unauthorized
human consumption, while still regulated.

Although two APHIS units, BRS and PPQ, share responsibility for
inspections of field test sites, BRS is responsible for the overall inspection
process. However, under the current site selection process, once BRS has
selected a notification or permit for inspection PPQ is then allowed to choose
the specific inspection site. The National Academy of Sciences states that
risks must be assessed according to the organism, trait, and environment.
Thus, the environment is an important risk factor which BRS should use in
the selection of field sites for inspection to ensure that the highest risk sites
are always selected.

————————————————–

Item 2
Lax Oversight Found in Tests of Gene-Altered Crops
New York Times
January 3, 2006
By ANDREW POLLACK
The Department of Agriculture has failed to regulate field trials of genetically engineered crops adequately, raising the risk of unintended environmental consequences, according to a stinging report issued by the department’s own auditor.
The report, issued late last month by the department’s Office of Inspector General, found that biotechnology regulators did not always notice violations of their own rules, did not inspect planting sites when they should have and did not assure that the genetically engineered crops were destroyed when the field trial was done.
In many cases, the report said, regulators did not even know the locations of field trials for which they granted permits.
The regulatory branch “lacks basic information about the field test sites it approves and is responsible for monitoring, including where and how the crops are being grown, and what becomes of them at the end of the field test,” the report said.
The audit results are likely to renew calls by environmental groups for tighter regulations. “Over all, I thought the report was devastating,” said Margaret Mellon, director of the food and environment program at the Union of Concerned Scientists in Washington.
Critics say genetically engineered crops could cause environmental harm, if, say, a gene for herbicide resistance spread to weeds, making them harder to kill.
In addition, the critics say, there could be harm to public health if a crop genetically engineered to produce a pharmaceutical or industrial chemical, for instance, accidentally found its way into the food supply.
The audit did not find any instances of known harm to public health or the environment.
However, the report said that weaknesses in regulations and in the internal management controls at the Department of Agriculture “increase the risk that genetically engineered organisms will inadvertently persist in the environment before they are deemed safe to grow without regulation.”
In a written response, the Agriculture Department’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, which regulates biotech field trials, said that it was already taking steps to adopt 23 of the 28 recommendations made by the inspector general, and that more changes were on the way.
W. Ron DeHaven, the administrator of the service, known as Aphis, wrote in the response, “Since 1987, Aphis has safely regulated G.E. organisms and provided oversight and enforcement for over 10,000 field tests with no demonstrable negative environmental impacts having arisen from these tests.”
A biotechnology industry spokeswoman said the report would have little effect because changes were already under way. “This is a report that was pretty much obsolete before it was ever published,” said the spokeswoman, Lisa Dry of the Biotechnology Industry Organization.
The inspector general’s office, however, said that further improvements would be required beyond those already planned.
Field trials are used to test experimental genetically engineered crops. Crop developers proposed to use 67,000 acres for such tests in 2004, up from 8,700 acres in 1994.
Once crops have proved themselves in field trials, the Agriculture Department can deregulate them, and seeds and harvested crops can be sold pretty much like any other seeds and crops.
The main varieties of genetically modified corn, cotton and soybeans grown in the United States have been deregulated.
The audit was conducted from May 2003 to April 2005 and involved visits to 91 field test sites as well as looking at records. The report said auditors found 13 instances of violations of rules at 11 of those sites.
One of the most controversial areas of agricultural biotechnology involves genetically engineering crops to produce pharmaceuticals and industrial chemicals. The Agriculture Department has stricter requirements for those crops than for genetically modified crops meant for food or animal feed.
However, the new report said the department often failed to enforce those stricter requirements. In most cases the auditors checked, the sites were not inspected five times each during field tests, as the department had promised. Nor were they inspected twice after the trial to make sure the crop was destroyed and the field fallow.
The report said that in two cases large harvests of pharmaceutical crops remained in storage for more than a year after the field test ended with regulators’ not knowing of the storage facility or approving it.
———————————————————————————————————————
Item 3

Report blasts oversight of test fields
Investigators say the USDA lacks details on what happens with pharma-crops.
DesMoines Register, USA, by Philip Brasher
(http://www.desmoinesregister.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/
20051230/BUSINESS01/512300334&SearchID=73231355071089)
30 Dec 2005

Washington, D.C. — The U.S. Department of Agriculture has failed to
properly oversee field trials of genetically engineered crops, including
plants designed to produce chemicals for medical and industrial uses,
investigators say.

A report released Thursday by the USDA’s inspector general said the
department “lacks basic information” on where field tests are or what is
done with the crops after they are harvested.

The report is the latest blow to prospects for developing an industry
based on mass-producing pharmaceutical chemicals from genetically
modified corn. Iowa Gov. Tom Vilsack once called the idea the “future of
our state.”

During the inspector general investigation, auditors found that two large
harvests of pharmaceutical crops remained in storage at test sites
without the USDA’s knowledge or approval.

The investigators also said that in 2003 the department failed to inspect
fields of pharmaceutical crops with the frequency that officials said
they would.

“Current (USDA) regulations, policies and procedures do not go far enough
to ensure the safe introduction of agricultural biotechnology,” the
report said.

The report “confirms the public’s lack of confidence in the USDA to
oversee pharmaceutical and industrial chemical crops,” said Susan Prolman
of the Union of Concerned Scientists, an advocacy group that has been
critical of the agricultural biotechnology industry.

USDA officials said they have made a number of improvements since the
investigation was done but disagree with some of the findings.

“We were addressing many of the issues as they were looking at the same
issues,” said Cindy Smith, deputy administrator for biotechnology
regulatory services in the USDA’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service.

She said violations cited in the report were minor. Also, the agency now
does all the required inspections of pharma-crop sites, including one
last summer near Burlington, Ia., she said.

The department is heeding one of the inspector general’s suggestions and
may make it mandatory for researchers to provide global positioning
coordinates for test sites.

Smith’s staff has grown from 23 to 65 since it was established in 2002.

The Agriculture Department oversaw 67,000 acres of biotech field trials
in 2004, up from 8,700 in 1994.

Relatively little of that acreage is devoted to pharmaceutical or
industrial crops, but there is special concern that those plants could
contaminate conventional crops or get into the food supply.

A small biotech company, ProdiGene Inc., was ordered to pay more than $3
million in penalties and cleanup costs in 2002 after mismanaging field
trials of pharmaceutical crops in Iowa and Nebraska.

Pharma crops are seen as a cheap way to mass-produce human and animal
drugs. Corn has been the crop of choice because it is relatively simple
to engineer and produces a lot of grain that can be easily stored and
processed.

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